Taking Play Seriously Beyond the Human Practices: Normativity and Social Play in Animals

Abstract

Traditional philosophy has characterized the phenomenon of normativity, i.e., the ability to act according to norms, as an exclusive capacity of human beings. In contrast, this tradition has considered the behavior of non-human animals to be mere responses to the environment, relegating their activity to the realm of instinct and survival. However, advances made since the 20th century in the field of ethology allow us to question this characterization. The aim of this work is to demonstrate the existence of normative aspects present in a type of behavior observed in various species: social play. We will undertake a conceptual analysis and a critical review of the philosophical literature and the results reported by empirical evidence regarding social play. Building upon a reconstruction of the concept of "practice" developed by Rawls (1955), we will attempt to show that social play exhibits normative characteristics that allow us to extend the notion of practice beyond our own species. Our main argument runs as follows: (1) every practice necessarily involves normativity; (2) social play in animals exhibits certain structural characteristics that make it relevant to describe it as a type of practice; and, therefore, (3) the thesis that certain species of non-human animals exhibit normative behavior is, at the very least, plausible and deserves to be seriously considered.