A theoretical juice extractor: The Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanation

Manuel Barrantes

Authors

Manuel Barrantes Departamento de Filosofía, California State University, Sacramento. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7997-5948

Keywords:

scientific explanation, mathematical explanation, representation, cicadas, rainbows, honeycombs

Abstract

It has recently been argued that mathematics can play a genuinely explanatory role in science. Cases where this is supposed to be the case have been divided into those where the explanatory role is played by mathematical operations, and those where it is played by mathematical entities. In this article, I analyze some of these purported cases and argue that claims that mathematics can be genuinely explanatory are unfounded. Throughout my discussion, I emphasize the representational role of mathematics, as opposed to its supposed explanatory role: the role of mathematics, even in the cases that I discuss, is to represent physical facts and help draw inferences about those facts.

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