A history of two congresses? Change and continuity in the operation of the Argentine Congress under the Cambiemos government
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Abstract
The literature on the Argentine Congress has contended that its agenda and working dynamics depend on the instructions from provincial political leaders, who control the political careers of legislators, and from the President, who controls the fiscal resources with which provincial governments finance themselves. Accordingly, Congress has been characterized by low fragmentation, high party discipline, and a clear divide between government and opposition, which have resulted in sustained success rates for the Executive's legislation, and agenda control by the majority or plurality party. However, the working of Congress under the minority coalition government of Cambiemos suggests the opposite: more fragmentation, less discipline, less clarity in the government-opposition cleavage, a smaller agenda, and less legislative success for the Executive. Does this mean that the dynamics of Congress as we hitherto knew it has changed? This article argues that is not the case, because in other periods with minority presidents and relatively high legislative fragmentation there were similar problems for agenda setting, meeting, and passing bills.
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