Los déficits de la coordinación intergubernamental en Argentina.

Abstract

Abstract: Argentina is a federal country with severe deficits in intergovernmental relations. The few existing coordination instances are insufficient to channel the multiplicity of multilevel public policy spheres typical of current cooperative federalisms. For its part, the lack of political agreements to implement the institutional arrangements resulting from the last constitutional reform of 1994 have pushed the country towards a fiscal federalism without rules of the game and an unfinished process of devolution of powers. To this are added the problems derived from the decentralization processes carried out in the seventies and nineties of the last century, by which the management and financing of two of the most expensive and complex state apparatuses to articulate were transferred to the provinces - education and health - without adequate planning of said transfer between the bureaucracies involved or an adequate analysis of the existing state capacities in each province. The addition of these factors reveals a severe deficit of RIGS that give way to intergovernmentality in Argentine federalism and, due to this, the dialogues between governments are preeminently informal and personalized, showing in them the asymmetries of power between the parties. This paper describes and analyzes in depth the deficits in norms, institutions and processes that give rise to multilevel dialogues and their main consequences in terms of balances of power in Argentine subnational federalism.