El efecto del calendario electoral en la autoselección de las cohortes legislativas y el comportamiento legislativo en Argentina, 1983–2007

Contenido principal del artículo

Adrian Lucardi
Juan Pablo Micozzi

Resumen

¿Cómo afectan las oportunidades electorales a las estrategias de carrera de los políticos? ¿En qué medida éstos responden estratégicamente a los incentivos que ofrece el calendario electoral? En este trabajo argumentamos que en una legislatura que combina patrones de ambición no estática con un calendario electoral escalonado, políticos con distintas características deberían mostrar distinta predisposición a competir en elecciones simultáneas o intermedias. Más concretamente, los políticos sin experiencia ejecutiva previa deberían candidatearse en las elecciones legislativas de medio término para aumentar su visibilidad entre los votantes, mientras que aquellos más experimentados lo deberían hacer en comicios concurrentes. Corroboramos estas afirmaciones usando datos de los miembros de la Cámara de Diputados argentina entre 1983 y 2007.

Detalles del artículo

Cómo citar
Lucardi, A., & Micozzi, J. P. (2021). El efecto del calendario electoral en la autoselección de las cohortes legislativas y el comportamiento legislativo en Argentina, 1983–2007. Administración Pública Y Sociedad (APyS), (11), 03–29. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/APyS/article/view/33856
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