Razonamiento animal: Negación y representaciones de ausencia

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Publicado: May 10, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5231
Palavras-chave:
animales no-humanos, criaturas no-lingüísticas, racionalidad, psicología comparativa, etología cognitiva, Bermúdez

Conteúdo do artigo principal

Jorge Morales Ladrón de Guevara
Columbia University. Philosophy Department

Resumo

En este trabajo rechazo la posibilidad de que el razonamiento animal, en particular la negación, involucre necesariamente la representación de Ausencia, como sugiere José Luis Bermúdez, pues ésta operaría como una negación lógica (no disponible para criaturas no lingüísticas). Experimentos de creencias falsas, fingimiento y comunicación muestran que animales no humanos (al menos ciertos primates) tienen dificultades para representar entidades o propiedades ausentes. Ofrezco una explicación alternativa recurriendo a los juicios sub-simbólicos de semejanza propuestos por Vigo & Allen e introduzco la noción de expectativa: la negación se da a través de la incompatibilidad entre una representación esperada y la actual. Finalmente, sostengo que el paradigma de expectativas puede ser extrapolado a otros experimentos en psicología cognitiva (tanto con niños prelingüísticos como con animales) para diseñar experimentos "justos" que examinen otras mentes considerando sus habilidades reales.

Detalhes do artigo

Como Citar
Razonamiento animal: Negación y representaciones de ausencia. (2011). Revista Argentina De Ciencias Del Comportamiento, 3(1), 20-33. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5231
Edição
Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"
Seção
Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes

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Como Citar

Razonamiento animal: Negación y representaciones de ausencia. (2011). Revista Argentina De Ciencias Del Comportamiento, 3(1), 20-33. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5231

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