Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind

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Published: May 10, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5232
Keywords:
self-knowledge, self-attribution, theory theory, simulation theory, intentionality

Main Article Content

Liza Skidelsky
Universidad de Buenos Aires

Abstract

Many philosophers consider that self-knowledge reflects the particularity that we can know what we think, believe, desire, in a different way in which we know the mental states of other people. This is the claim of an asymmetry between first and third person. Several approaches han been offered in the epistemological literature in order to account for this asymmetry. Nonetheless, unlike the expected compatibility between adjacent fields, the literature related to the attribution and self-attribution of mental states or, in general, what is called Theory of Mind, does not seem either to preserve this asymmetry or the attempt to preserve it undermines the fundamental role of the different Theory of Mind proposals. This paper will show this in two parts. Firstly, it addresses how the asymmetry thesis han been defended in the epistemological literature. The aim of this section is to offer a geography of the different approaches. Secondly, two proposals in Theory of Mind, the theory theory and simulation theory, will be evaluated in order to show why they do not account for the asymmetry thesis, and some of the consequences that would be gather from the attempt to conciliate these Theory of Mind proposals with the epistemological approaches that defend the asymmetry thesis will be analized.

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How to Cite
Skidelsky, L. (2011). Self-knowledge and attribution of mental states in Theory of Mind. Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 34–53. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5232
Issue
Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"
Section
Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes

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Author Biography

Liza Skidelsky, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas

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