Mechanism, explanatory pluralism and efficient coding explanation in neuroscience

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Published: Apr 3, 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.14650
Keywords:
mechanism unity of science explanatory pluralism causal explanation efficient coding explanation

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Sergio Daniel Barberis
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Alejandro Korn"

Abstract

There is a growing debate within the philosophical community about the unity or disunity of neuroscience. The new Mechanist philosophers claim that neuroscience exhibits a mosaic unity –one in which different explanatory models may contribute to the explanation of some explanandum phenomenon ? by setting causal constraints on the space of possible mechanisms for ?. Non-mechanist philosophers frequently adopt some form or another of explanatory pluralism. In this paper I argue, first, that Mechanism is compatible with a popular version of explanatory pluralism, which I call causally restricted pluralism. Then, I present a liberalized version of explanatory pluralism –one according to which there are models in neuroscience that are explanatory of some phenomenon ? but that do not set any causal constraint on the space of possible mechanisms for ?. Finally, I argue that there is at least one pattern of explanation in neuroscience –namely, efficient coding explanation– that is better accounted for by liberal pluralism.

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How to Cite
Barberis, S. D. (2017). Mechanism, explanatory pluralism and efficient coding explanation in neuroscience. Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 9(1), 9–18. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.14650
Issue
Vol. 9 No. 1 (2017): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
Section
Original Articles

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Author Biography

Sergio Daniel Barberis, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Alejandro Korn"

Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Becario Post-doctoral CONICET 2013-2105. Auxiliar Docente en Filosofía de las Ciencias, FFyL-UBA. Auxiliar Docente en Metafìsica, FFyL-UBA. Profesor Adjunto de Historia de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional de Moreno. Becario Fulbright 2016-2017.

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