The compositional nature of language: A challenge and a proposal

Article Sidebar

PDF (Español (España))
Published: Apr 3, 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.12931
Keywords:
composition, acquisition, historical change, multiplicity

Main Article Content

Eduardo Garcia Ramirez
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

Abstract

Since Frege (1892), the philosophical tradition has made sense of linguistic practice from the point of view of a compositional grammar. In this paper I have two goals in mind. First, I want to present a novel challenge that any theory of language must meet. According to this challenge a satisfactory account of language must not only include ordinary uses of language, but also an account of language acquisition, language development, grammatical changes through history within and across languages, and fictional uses of language. In arguing for this challenge I will make clear that the traditional compositional account is unable to meet the challenge, unless it comes forward with an independently supported empirical account of the problematic evidence. If it can do so, then the traditional account will be in much better shape, with new evidence on its behalf. My second goal consists in sketching a new alternative account of the compositional nature of language (the open view). This view gives place to a new theory, one that can successfully meet the challenge. Furthermore, this new proposal succeeds while presenting a simpler explanation with a greater predictive power.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Garcia Ramirez, E. (2017). The compositional nature of language: A challenge and a proposal. Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 9(1), 54–73. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.12931
Issue
Vol. 9 No. 1 (2017): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
Section
Original Articles

La RACC aplicará la licencia internacional de atribuciones comunes creativas (Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Bajo esta licencia, se permite cualquier explotación de la obra, incluyendo la explotación con fines comerciales y la creación de obras derivadas, la distribución de las cuales también está permitida sin ninguna restricción. Esta licencia es una licencia libre según la Freedom Defined. La única condición es que siempre y en todos los casos se cite a los autores y a la fuente original de publicación (i.e., RACC). Esta licencia fue desarrollada para facilitar el acceso abierto, gratuito y libre a trabajos originales científicos y artísticos.

Author Biography

Eduardo Garcia Ramirez, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

Soy Investigador Titular del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM desde 2010.

https://edugarciaramirez.wordpress.com/

Doctor en Filosofía con estudios en psicolingüística y psicología congitiva en la University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (EUA).

References

Akhtar, N., & Tomasello, M. (2000). The social nature of words and word learning. En R. M. Golinkoff, & K. Hirsh-Pasek (eds.), (2000). Becoming a word learner: A debate on lexical acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a ‘‘theory of mind’’? Cognition, 21, 37-46.

Bloom, P. (2000). How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Burge, T. (1973). Reference and proper names. Journal of Philosophy. 70(14), 426-39.

Clapp, L. J. (2012). Is even thought compositional? Philosophical Studies, 157, 299-322.

Diesendruck, G. (2005). The principles of conventionality and contrast in word learning: An empirical examination. Developmental

Psychology, 41, 451-63.

Diesendruck, G. (2007). Mechanisms of word learning. In E. Hoff & M. Shatz (eds.), (2007). Blackwell Handbook of Language Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Donnellan, K. (1972). Names and identifying descriptions. In G. Harman, & D. Davidson, (eds.), Semantics for Natural Language. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel.

Ezcurdia, M. (1995). Modos de presentación y modos de determinación. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, XXVII, 80, 57-96.

Ezcurdia, M. (2004). Pragmatic attitudes and semantic competence. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, XXXVI, 108, 55-82.

Frege, G. (1892). On sense and nominatum. In A. P. Martinich (ed.), (2002). The Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Friedman, O., & Leslie, A. M. (2007). The conceptual underpinnings of pretense: Pretending is not ‘behaving as if’. Cognition, 105, 103-24.

Fodor, J. A. (2001). Language, thought and compositionality. Mind & Language, 16, 1-15.

García-Ramírez, E. (2011). A cognitive theory of empty names, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 785-807.

Gerken, L. A. (2007). Acquiring linguistic structure. In E. Hoff, & M. Shatz, (2007). Blackwell Handbook of Language Development. Oxford: Blackwell.

Geurts, B. (1998). The mechanisms of denial. Language 74(2), 274-307.

Gleitman, L. R., Cassidy, K., Nappa, R., Papafragou, A., & Trueswell, J. C. (2005). Hard words, Language Learning and Development, 1, 23-64.

Gould, S. J., & Vrba, E. S. (1982). Exaptation, a missing term in the science of form Paleobiology, 8(1), 4-15.

Grice, H. P. (1989). Logic and Conversation. In H. P. Grice, 1989: Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, M. A: Harvard University Press.

Hall, G. (1996). Preschooler’s default assumptions about word meaning: Proper names designate unique individuals. Developmental Psychology, 32(1), 177-86.

Hall, G., & Graham, S. (1999). Lexical form class information guides word-to-object mapping in preschoolers, Child Development, 70(1), 78-91.

Hoff, E., & Shatz, M. (eds.), (2007). Blackwell Handbook of Language Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Jackson, F. (1998). Reference and description revisited, Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language, Mind, and Ontology, 201-218.

Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, et. al., (eds.), (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kripke, S. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), (1979). Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: Synthese.

Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of ‘‘theory of mind’’. Psychological Revie, 94, 412-26.

Leslie, A. M. (1994). Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM. Cognition, 50, 211-38.

Leslie, A. M. (2002). Pretense and representation revisited. In N. L. Stein, P. J. Bauer, M., Rabinowitz, (eds.), (2002). Representation, Memory, and Development: Essays in Honor of Jean Mandler. Mahwah, N. J: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Lewis, D. (1970). General semantics. Synthese, 1(2), 18-67.

Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In D. Lewis 1983: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. USA: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

Maiden, M., Smith, J. C., & Ledgeway, A. (2011). The Cambridge History of Romance Languages. Volumen 1 y 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maiden, M. (2011b). Morphonological Innovation. In Maiden, Smith y Ledgeway (eds.), (2011). The Cambridge History of Romance Languages. Volumen 1 y 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Markman, E. M. (1991). The whole object, taxonomic, and mutual exclusivity assumptions as initial constraints on word meaning. In

S.A. Gelman, & J. P. Byrnes, (eds.), (1991). Perspectives on Language and Thought: Interrrelations in Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Markman, E. M. (1992). Constraints on word learning: Speculations about their nature, origins, and domain specificity. In M. R. Gunnar & M. Maratsos (eds.). Modularity and constrains in language and cognition. Hillsdale, N. J: Erlbaum.

Montague, R. (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. R. Thomasson (ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nunberg, G. (1979). The non-uniqueness of semantic solutions: Polysemy. In Linguistics and Philosophy 3, 143-84.

Nunberg, G. (1995). Transfers of meaning. In Journal of Semantics 12(2), 109-32.

Nunberg, G. (2004). The pragmatics of deferred interpretation. In L. Horn (ed) 2004: The Handbook of Pragmatics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008). Darwin’s mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31, 109-178. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perner, J., Rendl, B., & Garnham, A. (2007). Objects of desire, thought, and reality: Problems of anchoring discourse referents in development. Mind & Language, 22(5), 475-513.

Perry, J. (1979). The case of the essential indexical. Nous, 13, 3-21.

Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. In H. Putnam, 1975: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Reference and modality. In W. V. O., Quine, (1961). From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper and Row.

Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s Puzzle. Ridgeview Publishing.

Shatz, M. (1987). Bootstrapping operations in child language. In K. E. Nelson y A. van Kleeck (eds.), (1987). Children’s Language, Vol. 6, Hilsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Shatz, M. (1994). A Toddler’s Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shatz, M. (2007a). On the development of the field of language development. In E. Hoff & M. Shatz, (eds.), (2007). Blackwell Handbook of Language Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Shatz, M. (2007b). Revisiting a Toddler’s Life for the toddler years: Conversational participation as a tool for learning across knowledge domains. In C.A. Brownwell & C.B. Kopp (eds.), (2007). Socioemotional Development in the Toddler Years. Guilford Press.

Shatz, M. (2008). Language as a consequence and an enabler of the exercise of higher-order relational capabilities: Evidence from toddlers. Brain and Behavioral Sciences, 31, 145-146.

Smith, J. C. (2011). Change and continuity in form-function relationships. In Maiden, Smith & Ledgeway (eds.), (2011). The Cambridge History of Romance Languages. Volumen 1 y 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soames, S. (2002). Beyond Rigidity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spelke, E. (2003). What makes us smart? Core Knowledge and Natural Language. In D. Gentner & S. Golding-Meadow, (eds.), (2003). Language in Mind: Advances in the Investigation of Language and Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Stalnaker, R. (1987). Semantics for belief. In R., Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stanley, J. (2005). Semantics in context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter, (eds.), (2005). Contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind. 59(235), 320-344.

Szabó, Z. (2012). The case for Compositionality. In Werning, Hinzen & Machery (eds.), (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tager-Flusberg, H. (2007). Atypical language development: Autism and other neurodevelopmental disorders. In E. Hoff & M. Shatz

(eds.), (2007). Blackwell Handbook of Language Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Travis, C. (1997). Pragmatics. In B. Hale & C. Wright. (eds.), (1997). A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wellman, H. M., & Miller, J. G. (2008). Including deontic reasoning as fundamental to theory of mind, Human Development, 51, 105-35.