Social norms in bribery experiments: the need for making explicit the normative status and duties of each role

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Published: Jul 22, 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v7.n2.10056
Keywords:
bribery experiment, social norm, ecological validity, external validity

Main Article Content

Hipólito Manuel Hasrun
Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades
Esteban Freidin
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur
Rodrigo Moro
Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades

Abstract

The first goal of this review is to propose a new classification of bribery situations based on two dimensiones: who initiates the corrupt exchange, and the normative status of those involved. The second oal is to provide a critical review and analysis of the literature on bribery experiments, taking into account the categories introduced. We show that social norms are not properly implemented in experimental games, which explains why the bribery categories defined are poorly modeled. We also discuss experimental evidence to show the potential empirical importance of making social norms explicit. We conclude that an adequate representation of social norms in games would allow increasing the ecological and external validity of bribery experiments.

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How to Cite
Hasrun, H. M., Freidin, E., & Moro, R. (2015). Social norms in bribery experiments: the need for making explicit the normative status and duties of each role. Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 7(2), 47–58. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v7.n2.10056
Issue
Vol. 7 No. 2 (2015): Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento
Section
Reviews

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Author Biographies

Hipólito Manuel Hasrun, Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades

Doctor en Filosofía. Asistente de Docencia (Jefe de trabajos prácticos).

 

Rodrigo Moro, Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Humanidades

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur.

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