Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action

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Romina Alejandra Ibarra
Lucía Amoruso

Abstract

By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking into account recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action. Particularly, by using the concept of motor representation.

Article Details

How to Cite
Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 12-19. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5230
Section
Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes
Author Biography

Lucía Amoruso, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Instituto Rosario de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Educación

Psicóloga, becaria doctoral del CONICET, desarrolla sus actividades en el IRICE-UNR (Instituto Rosario de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Educación)

How to Cite

Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: some reflections on the revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the cognitive neuroscience of action. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 12-19. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5230

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