Asset specificity and contractual relations: Analysis of a construction case study

Authors

  • Martín Dutto Unversidad Nacional del Litoral (Santa Fe, Argentina)
  • Marcos Gallacher Universidad del CEMA (CABA, Argentina)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55444/2451.7321.2011.v49.n1.6508

Keywords:

firm behavior, business economics

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to describe mechanism included in construction contracts that have the purpose of reducing transaction costs. Contractual solutions are analyzed focusing, in particular, on asset specificity and bounded rationality. A public works contract case is used as empirical evidence of the theoretical concepts.

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References

Coase, R. H. (1960), “The problem of social cost”, Journal of law and economics, 3 (octubre): 1-44.

Goldberg, Victor (1976), "Toward an expanded economic theory of contract", Journal of Economic Issues, 10 (March): 45-61.

Jensen, Michael C. y Meckling, William H., (1976). "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pp. 305-360, Octubre.

Jensen, M.C. (1986), “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers,” American Economic Review 26, p. 323.

Jensen, Michael C, (1986). "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pp. 323-29.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques y Tirole, Jean, (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, vol. 1, 1 ed., The MIT Press.

Ricketts, Martin (2002), "The economics of business enterprise", 3ra. Edición, Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Williamson, O. (1985), The economic institutions of capitalism, The Free Press.

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Published

2011-06-01

How to Cite

Dutto, M., & Gallacher, M. (2011). Asset specificity and contractual relations: Analysis of a construction case study. Revista De Economía Y Estadística, 49(1), 33–49. https://doi.org/10.55444/2451.7321.2011.v49.n1.6508

Issue

Vol. 49 No. 1 (2011)

Section

ARTÍCULOS

License

Copyright (c) 2011 Martín Dutto, Marcos Gallacher

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