Determinants of party and mayor reelection in local governments: An empirical examination for Argentina during 1983-2011
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55444/2451.7321.2018.v56.n1.29388Keywords:
reelection, transfers, fiscal policy, local governmentsAbstract
This paper examines the determinants of reelection of parties and mayors in Argentine local elections during the 1983-2011 period. Using a unique and comprehensive database recording local elecion results for over 1200 local governments, we test three potential sources of variation: structural factors, polítical/institutional variables and economic variables. We find that incumbency advantage is strongly and significantly related with a higher probability of reelection. We also find some evidence supporting the economic voting hypothesis, that local economic conditions are relevant for explaining re-election of local governments. We also find that local governments where parties and mayors have been in office for a long time have greater re-election chances. Finally, we find that governments with municipal charters have lower probability of reelection. Summing up, there seems to be both economic and politico-institucional factors behind re-election rates of parties and mayors in Argentine local governments.
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