Expandiendo el espacio de búsqueda para una ciencia de la conciencia perceptual

Alfonso Nicolás Venturelli

Resumen


Desarrollo un modo de interpretar la contribución procedente del conglomerado de programas de investigación, posturas metodológicas y conjeturas filosóficas conocido como el enfoque corporizado para el estudio de la cognición. Para hacer esto, me concentro en una de estas propuestas: el llamado enfoque enactivo para el estudio de la percepción, en especial como ha sido propuesto por el filósofo Alva Noë y con un interés particular en el problema de la conciencia perceptual y la disputa asociada acerca de los correlatos neuronales de la conciencia. Argumento que el enfoque enactivo debiera ser primariamente entendido como proveyendo un marco conceptual de relevancia metodológica para favorecer el diseño de cierto tipo de estudios sobre percepción y conciencia perceptual.

Palabras clave


cognición corporizada; enfoque enactivo; conciencia perceptual; correlatos neuronales de la conciencia; Alva Noë

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Referencias


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n2.5226

Copyright (c) 2011 Alfonso Nicolás Venturelli

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