Tax Reform in Argentina: Some necessary previous definitions
Keywords:
Tax System, Tax Reform, ArgentinaAbstract
There is general acceptance that our current tax “system” has serious drawbacks. But there are also notable differences regarding which are the advisable reforms. To sort the approach to the subject matter, the basic regulatory criteria in which any proposal of a new advisable tax system rests are set out, derived from the academic literature on Public Finance and the practical experience of other nations. Fiscal relations are a part of the rules, rights and faculties of each of the sectors, established in the institutional system that defines the National Constitution. Recent progress in the political economy and the institutional economy have produced important results for the understanding of the interrelations in the economic and institutional systems, and they are applicable to the tax system. The work seeks to incorporate these new contributions to derive regulatory criteria. On the other hand, a tax reform is a complex phenomenon. This is a change on an existent system that has to continue working with important effects on the transition. A tax reform is an institutional change of significant importance. This advises to define matters such as the political-economical system where the institutional reform and order will be applied, which will rule the relationship between the taxpayer citizen and the treasury, the scope of the use of power, the relationship between rules and discretion.
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